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Intervention in Power Control Games
With Selfish Users
Yuanzhang Xiao, Jaeok Park, and Mihaela van der Schaar, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
We study the power control problem in single-hop wireless ad hoc networks with selfish users.
Without incentive schemes, selfish users tend to transmit at their maximum power levels, causing excessive
interference to each other. In this paper, we study a class of incentive schemes based on intervention
to induce selfish users to transmit at desired power levels. In a power control scenario, an intervention
scheme can be implemented by introducing an intervention device that can monitor the power levels
of users and then transmit power to cause interference to users if necessary. Focusing on first-order
intervention rules based on individual transmit powers, we derive conditions on the intervention rates
and the power budget to achieve a desired outcome as a (unique) Nash equilibrium with intervention and
propose a dynamic adjustment process to guide users and the intervention device to the desired outcome.
We also analyze the effect of using aggregate receive power instead of individual transmit powers. Our
results show that intervention schemes can be designed to achieve any positive power profile while using
interference from the intervention device only as a threat. Lastly, simulation results are presented to
illustrate the performance improvement from using intervention schemes and the theoretical results.
Index Terms
Game theory, incentives, intervention, power control, wireless networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Power control is an essential resource allocation scheme to control signal-to-interference-and-noise
ratios (SINRs) for efficient transmission in wireless networks. Extensive studies have been done on
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2power control (see [1] and references therein for an overview of the literature in this topic). In many
earlier works on power control, each user has a fixed minimum SINR requirement and then minimizes its
transmit power subject to the SINR requirement [1, Ch. 2][2][3]. This approach is suitable for fixed-rate
communications with voice applications. However, with the growing importance of data and multimedia
applications, users are no longer satisfied with a fixed SINR requirement, but they seek to maximize their
utility reflecting the quality of service (QoS). To this end, most recent works formulate the problem in
the network utility maximization framework. In this framework, a central controller can compute optimal
transmit power levels when the utility functions are such that the network utility maximization problem
is convex, and then assigns the optimal power levels to users. Assuming that users are obedient to the
central controller, the problem can also be solved in a distributed manner [1, Ch. 4][4][5].
Besides the network utility maximization framework, many works use noncooperative games to model
the distributed power control problem, in which each user maximizes its own utility, instead of maximizing
the network utility. In a noncooperative game model with a single frequency channel, each user tends to
transmit at its maximum power level to obtain high throughput, causing excessive interference to other
users. This outcome may be far from the global optimality of social welfare [1][4][6], especially when
interference among users is strong [7]. To improve the noncooperative outcome, various power control
schemes have been proposed based on pricing [8]–[12], auctions [13], and mechanism design [14][15].
These works aim to achieve a better outcome by modifying the objective functions of users using taxation
and developing a distributed method based on the optimization of the modified objective functions. Users
are assumed to be obedient in that they accept the objective functions and follow the rule prescribed by
the designer, and prices are used as control signals to guide users to a desired outcome. However, selfish
users may have their own innate objectives which are different from the assigned objectives and may
ignore control signals and deviate from the prescribed rule if they are better off by doing so.
In summary, the methods in most existing works are not suitable for power control with selfish users.
Selfish behavior of users can arise in many practical scenarios without central controllers, such as wireless
ad hoc networks, where each user transmits information from its own transmitter to its own receiver,
and multi-cell cellular networks, where the base station cannot control the interfering mobile stations
in other cells. Hence, it is important to design an incentive scheme to induce selfish users to achieve
a desirable outcome in power control scenarios. One method to provide incentives for selfish users is
to impose taxation as real money payment. However, in order to achieve a desired outcome with a
pricing scheme, the designer needs to know how payment affects the payoffs of users, which is often
the private information of users. The designer may use a mechanism design approach as in [14][15] to
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3elicit private information, but it generally requires heavy communication overheads.1 Another method
to provide incentives is to use repeated games [16][17]. However, effective incentive schemes based on
repeated games require users to have long-run frequent interactions and to be sufficiently patient [18].
Recently, a new class of incentive schemes has been proposed based on the idea of intervention [19]–
[21]. To implement an intervention scheme, we need an intervention device that can monitor the actions of
users and intervene in their interaction if necessary. The monitoring technology of the intervention device
determines what it can observe about the actions of users, while its intervention capability determines
the extent to which it can intervene in their interaction. An intervention rule prescribes the action that the
intervention device should take as a function of its observation. Among existing works on intervention
schemes, [19] and [20] applied intervention schemes to contention games in the medium access control
(MAC) layer, while [21] studied the impact of the monitoring technology and the intervention capability
on the system performance in an abstract model. We also note that [22] proposed a packet-dropping
mechanism for queueing games using an idea similar to intervention. In this paper, we focus on a power
control scenario and study intervention schemes in this particular scenario.
In the power control scenario considered in this paper, the intervention device estimates the individual
transmit power of each user or the aggregate receive power at its receiver and then transmits at a certain
power level following the intervention rule prescribed by the designer. In order to achieve a target
operating point, the designer can use an intervention rule such that the intervention device transmits
minimum, possibly zero, power if users are transmitting at the desired power levels, while transmitting
at a high power level to reduce the SINRs of users if a deviation is detected. In this way, an intervention
scheme can punish the misbehavior of users and regulate the power transmission of selfish users. We
first consider a monitoring technology with which the intervention device can estimate the individual
transmit power of each user without errors. While focusing on a simple class of intervention rules called
first-order intervention rules, we study the requirements for the parameters of first-order intervention
rules to achieve a given target power profile as a (unique) Nash equilibrium (NE). We propose a
dynamic adjustment process that the designer can use to guide users to the target power profile through
intermediate targets. We then relax the monitoring requirement and consider a monitoring technology
with which the intervention device can estimate only the aggregate receive power. We show that with
aggregate observation, intervention rules can be designed to achieve a given target as a NE but rarely as
1Another drawback of [14] and [15] is the assumption that each user’s utility function is jointly concave in all the users’
power levels, which seems to be unrealistic in power control scenarios.
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4a unique NE. Our results provide a systematic design principle based on which a designer can choose
an intervention scheme (an intervention device and an intervention rule) to achieve a desired outcome.
Our analysis suggests that, unlike pricing schemes, it is possible for the designer to design effective
intervention schemes without having knowledge about how users value their SINRs, as long as their utility
is monotonically increasing with their own SINRs. We also propose a method based on intervention for
the designer to estimate the cross channel gains, the noise powers, and maximum transmit power levels of
users without any cooperative behavior of users such as sending pilot signals for channel estimation and
reporting the estimates to the designer. After obtaining relevant information, the designer can configure
an intervention rule to achieve a target operating point as NE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model of power
control with intervention. In Section III, we propose design criteria for intervention rules, performance
characteristics to evaluate intervention rules, and classes of intervention rules. In Section IV, we study
the design of first-order intervention rules to achieve a target power profile. In Section V, we discuss
implementation issues related to intervention. Simulation results are presented in Section VI. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper. For the ease of reference, we summarize major notation used in this
paper in Table I.
II. MODEL OF POWER CONTROL WITH INTERVENTION
We consider a single-hop wireless ad hoc network, where a fixed set of N users and an intervention
device transmit in a single frequency channel. The set of the users is denoted by N , {1, 2, . . . , N}. Each
user has a transmitter and a receiver. Each user i chooses its transmit power pi in the set Pi , [0, Pi], where
Pi > 0 for all i ∈ N . The power profile of all the users is denoted by p = (p1, . . . , pN ) ∈ P ,
∏N
i=1 Pi,
and the power profile of all the users other than user i is denoted by p−i.
In the network, there is an intervention device, sometimes referred to as user 0, that consists of a
transmitter and a receiver. The receiver of the intervention device can monitor the power profile of the
users, while the transmitter can create interference to the users by transmitting power. Once the users
choose their power profile, the intervention device obtains a signal y ∈ Y , where Y is the set of all
possible signals. We assume that the signal is realized deterministically given a power profile and use the
signal determination function ρ : P → Y to denote the signal given the power profile p.2 After observing
2More generally, we can assume that the signal is realized randomly given a power profile and use ρ(p) to represent the
probability distribution of signals given p. We leave the analysis of this general case for future research.
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5TABLE I
SUMMARY OF MAJOR NOTATION.
Symbol Description
N Number of (regular) users in the network
N Set of users, N , {1, . . . , N}
Pi Maximum transmit power level of user i; i ∈ N
P0 Power budget of the intervention device, or the intervention capability
Pi User i’s action space Pi , [0, Pi]; i ∈ N ∪ {0}
pi Transmit power level of user i, pi ∈ Pi; i ∈ N ∪ {0}
p Power profile of the users, p = (p1, . . . , pN) ∈ P ,
∏N
i=1
Pi
p⋆ Target power profile, p⋆ = (p⋆1, . . . , p⋆N )
P Profile of the maximum power levels, P = (P1, . . . , PN)
hij Channel gain from user j’s transmitter to user i’s receiver; i, j ∈ N ∪ {0}
ni Noise power at user i’s receiver
γi SINR at user i’s receiver
Y Set of all possible signals obtained by the intervention device
ρ Signal determination function, ρ : P → Y
f Intervention rule, f : Y → P0
E(f) Set of power profiles sustained by f
FK(p
⋆) Set of Kth-order intervention rules with target power profile p⋆
PBK(p
⋆) Minimum power budget to sustain p⋆ using Kth-order intervention rules
PBsK(p
⋆) Minimum power budget to strongly sustain p⋆ using Kth-order intervention rules
fI1 First-order intervention rule based on individual transmit powers
αi Intervention rate for user i in fI1 ; i ∈ N
fA1 First-order intervention rule based on aggregate receive power
α0 Aggregate intervention rate in fA1
N˜ (p⋆) Set of users whose target powers are less than the maximum power levels, N˜ (p⋆) = {i ∈ N : p⋆i < Pi}
N ′ Number of users whose target powers are less than the maximum power levels, N ′ = |N˜ (p⋆)|
{(f t,pt)}Tt=1 Sequence of intervention rules and power profiles in the dynamic adjustment process
{p˜t}Tt=1 Sequence of intermediate target power profiles in the dynamic adjustment process
d(p,p′) Relative distance between two power profiles p and p′, d(p,p′) =
∑N
i=1(pi − p
′
i)/pi
T ⋆(p⋆) Minimum convergence time (in steps) for the dynamic adjustment process to reach p⋆
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6a signal, the intervention device chooses its own transmit power p0 in the set P0 , [0, P0], where P0 > 0.
We call (Y, ρ) the monitoring technology of the intervention device, and call P0 its intervention capability.
The ability of an intervention device is characterized by its monitoring technology and intervention
capability. We call the transmit powers of the intervention device and the users (p0,p) ∈ P0 × P an
outcome.
The QoS obtained by user i is determined by its SINR, denoted by γi. We use a block-fading channel
model with sufficiently long fading blocks, as in [2]–[5],[7]–[17]. In one block, for i, j ∈ N ∪{0}, let hij
be the channel gain from user j’s transmitter to user i’s receiver, and let ni be the noise power at user i’s
receiver. If code-division multiple accessing (CDMA) is used, the channel gain is defined as the effective
channel gain taking into account the spreading factor. In one block, the users and the intervention device
transmit at constant power levels p and p0, respectively.3 Then the SINR of user i ∈ N is given by
γi(p0,p) =
hiipi
hi0p0 +
∑
j 6=i hijpj + ni
.4 (1)
We assume that each user i ∈ N has monotonic preferences on its own SINR in the sense that it weakly
prefers γi to γ′i if and only if γi ≥ γ′i. Our analysis does not require any other properties of preferences
(for example, preferences do not need to be represented by a concave utility function).5
In our setting, the intervention device has a receiver to measure the aggregate receive power from all
the users. Furthermore, if the receiver moves and takes measurement at different locations, it can estimate
the individual transmit power of each user as well. Thus, in this paper we will focus on two types of
monitoring technology with which the intervention device can estimate individual transmit powers p or
an aggregate receive power
∑N
i=1 h0ipi. In other words, we consider two signal determination functions,
ρ(p) = p and ρ(p) =
∑N
i=1 h0ipi.
3In practice, there is a time lag between when the users transmit and when the intervention device transmits because the
intervention has to monitor the users’ power profile in order to decide its transmit power level. In this paper, we assume that
this time lag is short and negligible compared to the length of fading blocks, although in principle we can take into account the
time lag in the users’ utility functions. See, for example, [20] for a model that takes into account the time lag explicitly.
4Throughout the paper, we use j 6= i with the summation operator to mean j ∈ N \ {i}, not j ∈ N ∪ {0} \ {i}.
5The preferences of a user may be defined on dimensions other than its SINR. For example, a user may use the ratio of SINR
to transmit power as the utility function, as in [9], because it may care about its energy consumption as well. Our approach can
be applied to such a scenario if utility functions representing the users’ preferences are known to the designer.
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7III. DESIGN OF INTERVENTION RULES
A. Design Criteria
Since the intervention device transmits its power after it obtains a signal, its strategy can be represented
by a mapping f : Y → P0, which is called an intervention rule. The SINR of user i when the intervention
device uses an intervention rule f and the users choose a power profile p is given by γi(f(ρ(p)),p). With
an abuse of notation, we will use f(p) to mean f(ρ(p)). Given an intervention rule f , the interaction
among the users that choose their own power levels selfishly can be modeled as a non-cooperative game,
whose strategic form is given by
Γf = 〈N , (Pi)i∈N , (γi(f(·), ·))i∈N 〉. (2)
We can predict the power profile chosen by the users given an intervention rule using the concept of
Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1: A power profile p∗ ∈ P is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γf if
γi(f(p
∗),p∗) ≥ γi(f(pi,p
∗
−i), pi,p
∗
−i) (3)
for all pi ∈ Pi and all i ∈ N .
When a power profile p∗ is a NE of Γf , no user has the incentive to deviate from p∗ unilaterally
provided that the intervention device uses intervention rule f . Moreover, if p∗ is a unique NE of Γf ,
intervention has robustness in that the designer does not need to worry about coordination failure (i.e.,
the possibility that the users get stuck in a “wrong” equilibrium).
Definition 2: An intervention rule f (strongly) sustains a power profile p∗ if p∗ is a (unique) NE of
the game Γf .
We use E(f) to denote the set of all power profiles sustained by f . Suppose that the designer has a
welfare function U0(γ1, . . . , γN ), defined on the users’ SINRs. Then the objective of the designer is to
find a target power profile that maximizes the welfare function and an intervention rule that (strongly)
sustains the target power profile. Formally, the design problem solved by the designer can be written as
max
p
max
f
{U0(γ1(f(p),p), . . . , γN (f(p),p)) : p ∈ E(f)}. (4)
If uniqueness is desired, we can replace p ∈ E(f) in (4) with {p} = E(f). Note that a solution to the
design problem (4), p⋆ and f∗, must satisfy f∗(p⋆) = 0, namely no intervention if the users choose the
target power profile. Based on this observation, the design problem (4) can be solved in two steps. In
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8the first step, we obtain a target power profile p⋆ by solving
max
p
{U0(γ1(0,p), . . . , γN (0,p)) : p ∈ P}. (5)
There always exists a solution to the optimization problem (5) as long as the welfare function U0 is
continuous in γ1, . . . , γN . Under some welfare functions, e.g. U0(γ1, . . . , γN )
∑N
i=1 log(γi) as in [4][5],
the optimization problem (5) is convex, and thus easy to solve. If (5) is solved off-line, the designer
can choose other welfare functions even though the resulting optimization problem is nonconvex. In the
second step, we look for an intervention rule f such that f(p⋆) = 0 and p⋆ ∈ E(f) (or {p⋆} = E(f)),
given the target power profile p⋆ obtained in the first step.
The first step of solving the design problem (4), namely finding the target power profile p⋆, requires
knowledge about the parameters in the model, hij , ni, and Pi for all i, j ∈ N ∪ {0}. In Section V-A,
we propose a method for the designer to estimate the relevant system parameters needed to solve (5)
based on intervention. Note, however, that solving the problem (5) does not require the designer to know
the details of the users’ preferences on their SINRs since knowing the expressions for SINRs suffices
to evaluate the welfare function and to check the incentive constraints. To highlight the informational
advantage of our approach, let us consider a pricing scheme, in which each user i is charged πi(p) when
the users choose a power profile p. Suppose that each user i has quasilinear preferences on its own SINR
and payment which are represented by a utility function of the form ui(γi)− πi. Then in order to find
a pricing scheme that sustains a target profile p⋆, the designer needs to know ui for all i ∈ N . Since a
pricing scheme uses an outside instrument to influence the decisions of the users, the designer needs to
know how the users value SINRs relative to payments, which is subjective and thus hard to measure. On
the contrary, an intervention scheme affects the users through their SINRs, and thus the designer does
not need to know how the users value their SINRs.
In the subsequent discussion of this paper, we focus on the second step of solving the design problem
(4), assuming that a target power profile p⋆ has been found. That is, we aim to find an intervention rule f
that (strongly) sustains p⋆, namely p⋆ ∈ E(f) (or {p⋆} = E(f)), and that satisfies f(p⋆) = 0. Since user
i can guarantee a positive SINR by choosing a positive power, it is impossible to provide an incentive
for user i to choose pi = 0 using any intervention rule. Thus, we assume that p⋆ ∈
∏
i(0, Pi]. We say
that (f,p⋆) is an (intervention) equilibrium if p⋆ ∈ E(f) and f(p⋆) = 0. At an equilibrium, no user has
an incentive to deviate unilaterally while the designer fulfills his design criteria. Thus, an equilibrium
can be considered as a stable configuration of an intervention rule and a power profile. An equilibrium
can be achieved following the procedure described below.
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91) The designer chooses a target power profile p⋆ and an intervention rule f .
2) The users choose their power profile p, knowing the intervention rule chosen by the designer.6
3) The intervention device obtains a signal ρ(p) and chooses its power p0 = f(p).
To execute the above procedure, we may consider an adjustment process (e.g., one based on best-response
updates) for the users and the intervention device to reach an equilibrium (see Section IV-B), as well as
an estimation process for the intervention device to obtain a signal (see Section V-A). It is an implicit
underlying assumption of our analysis that the time it takes to reach a final outcome (i.e., the duration
of the procedure) is short relative to the time for which the final outcome lasts. This justifies that in
our model, the users fully take into account interference from the intervention device that is realized
at the final outcome when they make decisions about their powers. When a network parameter changes
(e.g., some users leave or join the network, or move to different locations), a new target is chosen
and the procedure is repeated to achieve a new equilibrium. Thus, our analysis holds as long as network
parameters do not change frequently, whereas providing incentives using a repeated game strategy usually
requires an infinite horizon and sufficiently patient players.
Another important underlying assumption in our analysis is that the designer can commit to the
intervention rule it chooses. Since U0 is increasing in each γi and each γi is decreasing in p0, the
designer prefers not to intervene at all, i.e., it prefers to choose p0 = 0. However, if p0 is held fixed at 0,
the users will choose P. The role of the intervention device is to provide a punishment mechanism for
the users to choose a desired power profile other than P; the device should choose a high power level if
a deviation is detected. Without the designer’s commitment to the intervention rule, the designer would
choose p0 = 0 (e.g., by disabling the intervention device) regardless of the power profile chosen by the
users. Predicting this behavior of the designer, the users would choose P, resulting in the same outcome
as with no intervention. Therefore, in order for the proposed intervention schemes to provide incentives
successfully, it is critical that the designer executes punishment as promised to make punishment credible.
In practice, credibility can be achieved by programming the intervention rule in the intervention device
and making the program difficult to manipulate.
Finally, the benchmark is the welfare when there is no intervention device in the network, i.e., p0 is
held fixed at 0. In this case, γi is always strictly increasing in pi, and thus P , (P1, . . . , PN ) is the
6The intervention rule can be broadcast to the users, or learned by the users from experimentation.
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unique NE of the game 〈N , (Pi)i∈N , (γi(0, ·))i∈N 〉.7 Thus, the case of p⋆ = P is trivial, because there
is no need to use an incentive scheme in order to achieve the power profile P. Hence, our main interest
lies in the case of p⋆ 6= P, although our analysis does not exclude the case of p⋆ = P. The case of
p⋆ 6= P arises in many situations, for example, when interference among users is strong and welfare is
measured by the sum of utilities or the minimum of utilities [1][4][6][7].
B. Performance Characteristics
Given a target power profile p⋆, there are potentially many intervention rules f that satisfy the design
criteria p⋆ ∈ E(f) and f(p⋆) = 0. Thus, below we propose several performance characteristics with
which we can evaluate different intervention rules satisfying the design criteria.
1) Monitoring requirement: The minimum amount of information about the power profile that is
required for the intervention device to execute a given intervention rule (assuming perfect estimation).
2) Intervention capability requirement: The minimum intervention capability needed for the intervention
device to execute a given intervention rule, i.e., supp∈P f(p). (Even though there is no intervention at an
equilibrium, the intervention device should have an intervention capability P0 ≥ supp∈P f(p) in order
to make the intervention rule f credible to the users.)
3) Strong sustainment: Whether a given intervention rule strongly sustains the target power profile p⋆.
4) Complexity: The complexity of a given intervention rule in terms of design, broadcast/learning, and
computation.
C. Classes of Intervention Rules
Without loss of generality, we can express an intervention rule f satisfying f(p⋆) = 0 as f(p) =
[g(p)]P00 , where [x]ba = min{max{x, a}, b}, for some function g : P → R such that g(p⋆) = 0. Also,
since the designer desires to achieve p⋆, it is natural to consider functions g that increase as the users
deviate from p⋆. Hence, we consider the following classes of intervention rules,
FK(p
⋆) =
f : f(p) =
[
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
αi,k|pi − p
⋆
i |
k
]P0
0
for some αi,k ≥ 0 and P0 > 0
 , (6)
for K = 1, 2, . . .. We call an intervention rule f ∈ FK(p⋆) a Kth-order intervention rule with target
power profile p⋆. As K becomes larger, the set FK(p⋆) contains more intervention rules, but at the
7This is true for any constant intervention rule, where p0 is chosen independently of the observation of the intervention device.
This shows the inability of traditional Stackelberg games, where the leader (the intervention device) takes an action before the
followers (the users) do, to provide incentives in our setting.
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same time complexity increases. Simple intervention rules are desirable for the designer, the users, and
the intervention device. As K is smaller, the designer has less design parameters and less burden of
broadcasting the intervention rule; the users can more easily learn the intervention rule and find their
best responses during an adjustment process; and the intervention device can more quickly compute the
value of the intervention rule at the chosen power profile. Thus, our analysis mainly focuses on first-order
intervention rules, the simplest among the above classes.
Let F˜K(p⋆) (F˜sK(p⋆)) be the set of all Kth-order intervention rules that (strongly) sustains p⋆, i.e.,
F˜K(p
⋆) = {f ∈ FK(p
⋆) : p⋆ ∈ E(f)} and F˜sK(p⋆) = {f ∈ FK(p⋆) : {p⋆} = E(f)}. We define the
minimum power budget8 for a Kth-order intervention rule to (strongly) sustain p⋆ by
PBK(p
⋆) = inf
f∈F˜K(p⋆)
sup
p∈P
f(p), and PBsK(p
⋆) = inf
f∈F˜sK(p
⋆)
sup
p∈P
f(p). (7)
Thus, with an intervention capability P0 > PBK(p⋆) (P0 > PBsK(p⋆)), there exists a Kth-order
intervention rule that (strongly) sustains p⋆. We set PBK(p⋆) = +∞ (PBsK(p⋆) = +∞) if there
is no Kth-order intervention rule that (strongly) sustains p⋆ (i.e., F˜K(p⋆) (F˜sK(p⋆)) is empty). Since
FK(p
⋆) ⊂ FK ′(p
⋆) for all K,K ′ such that K ≤ K ′, both PBK(p⋆) and PBsK(p⋆) are weakly
decreasing in K for all p⋆. This suggests a trade-off between complexity and the minimum power
budget. Also, since F˜sK(p⋆) ⊂ F˜K(p⋆), we have PBK(p⋆) ≤ PBsK(p⋆) for all K and p⋆. The difference
PBsK(p
⋆) − PBK(p
⋆) can be interpreted as the price of strong sustainment in terms of the minimum
power budget.
IV. ANALYSIS OF FIRST-ORDER INTERVENTION RULES
A. Design of Intervention Rules
We consider first-order intervention rules of the form
f I1 (p) =
[
N∑
i=1
αi|pi − p
⋆
i |
]P0
0
. (8)
Under a first-order intervention rule, the intervention device increases its transmit power linearly with
the deviation of each user from the target power, |pi− p⋆i |, in the range of its intervention capability. We
call αi the intervention rate for user i, which measures how sensitive intervention reacts to a deviation
of user i. Let N˜ (p⋆) = {i ∈ N : p⋆i < Pi}. Without loss of generality, we label the users in such a way
8As to be shown later, for strong sustainment, we need P0 to exceed a certain value. Thus, we actually mean “infimum”
power budget by minimum power budget.
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that i ∈ N˜ (p⋆) if and only if i ≤ N ′, where N ′ = |N˜ (p⋆)|. Since the users have natural incentives to
choose their maximum powers in the absence of intervention, we need to provide incentives only for the
users in N˜ (p⋆). The following theorem shows that when the intervention capability is sufficiently large,
the designer can always find intervention rates to have a given target power profile p⋆ sustained by a
first-order intervention rule.
Theorem 1: For any p⋆ ∈
∏
i(0, Pi], p
⋆ ∈ E(f I1 ) if and only if
αi ≥
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j + ni
p⋆ihi0
(9)
and
P0 ≥
(Pi − p
⋆
i )(
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j + ni)
p⋆ihi0
(10)
for all i ∈ N˜ (p⋆).
Proof: See [23, Appendix B].
We can interpret Theorem 1 as follows. As hi0 is larger, intervention causes more interference to user
i with the same transmit power, and thus the intervention rate αi can be chosen smaller to yield the
same interference. When
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j + ni is large, interference to user i from other users and its noise
power are already strong, and thus the intervention rate αi should be large in order for intervention to be
effective. Hence, hi0/(
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j + ni) can be interpreted as the effectiveness of intervention to user i.
Without intervention, users have natural incentives to increase their transmit powers. Thus, as the target
power for user i, p⋆i , is smaller, the incentive for user i to deviate is stronger, and thus a larger intervention
rate αi is needed to prevent deviation. Note that (Pi − p⋆i ) is the maximum possible deviation by user
i (in the direction where it has a natural incentive to deviate). The minimum intervention capability in
the right-hand side of (10) is increasing with the maximum possible deviation and the strength of the
incentive to deviate while decreasing with the effectiveness of intervention.
A first-order intervention rule f I1 satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1 may have a NE other than the
target power profile p⋆. For example, if P0 ≤
∑
j 6=i αj(Pj − p
⋆
j) for all i ∈ N˜ (p⋆), P is also sustained
by f I1 . The presence of this extra NE is undesirable since it brings a possibility that the users still choose
P while the intervention device causes interference to the users by transmitting its maximum power
P0. Obviously, this outcome (P0,P) is worse for every user than the outcome at the unique NE without
intervention (0,P). In order to eliminate this possibility, the designer may want to choose an intervention
rule that strongly sustains the target power profile. The following theorem provides a sufficient condition
for a first-order intervention rule to strongly sustain a given target power profile.
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Theorem 2: For any p⋆ ∈
∏
i(0, Pi], {p
⋆} = E(f I1 ) if
αi >
1
p⋆i
∑
j>i
αj(Pj − p
⋆
j) +
∑
j<i hijp
⋆
j +
∑
j>i hijPj + ni
p⋆ihi0
(11)
and
P0 >
Pi
p⋆i
∑
j>i
αj(Pj − p
⋆
j) +
(Pi − p
⋆
i )(
∑
j<i hijp
⋆
j +
∑
j>i hijPj + ni)
p⋆ihi0
(12)
for all i ∈ N˜ (p⋆).9
Proof: See [23, Appendix C].
By comparing Theorems 1 and 2, we can see that the requirements for the intervention rates and the
intervention capability is higher when we impose strong sustainment. For any given power profile, the
intervention rates can be chosen sequentially to satisfy the condition (11) starting from user N ′ down
to user 1. We can set αi = 0 for all i /∈ N˜ (p⋆). Unlike Theorem 1, the choice of the intervention rates
affects the minimum required intervention capability. For strong sustainment, the intervention capability
is required to be larger as the designer chooses larger intervention rates. A main reason for the existence
of an extra NE is that the region of power profiles on which the maximum intervention power is applied
is so wide that the users cannot escape the region by unilateral deviation. Thus, a larger intervention
capability is needed to reduce the region and guarantee the uniqueness of NE.
From Theorem 1, we obtain
PB1(p
⋆) = max
i
(Pi − p
⋆
i )(
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j + ni)
p⋆i hi0
. (13)
Since Theorem 2 gives a sufficient condition for strong sustainment, we obtain an upper bound on
PBs1(p
⋆),
PB
s
1(p
⋆) =
N∑
i=1
i−1∏
j=1
Pj
p⋆j
 (Pi − p⋆i )(∑j<i hijp⋆j +∑j>i hijPj + ni)
p⋆ihi0
 . (14)
Note that PB1(p⋆) ≤ PB
s
1(p
⋆) with equality if and only if N ′ ≤ 1. Combining these results, we can
bound PBs1(p⋆) by
PB1(p
⋆) ≤ PBs1(p
⋆) ≤ PB
s
1(p
⋆). (15)
By Theorems 1 and 2, we know that first-order intervention rules can sustain the set
∏
i(0, Pi]. Note
that among all the efficient power profiles, those with pi = 0 for some i have probability measure zero.
9We define
∑
j∈J
xj = 0 if J is empty. Similarly, we define
∏
j∈J
xj = 1 if J is empty.
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Hence, we obtain almost the entire set of feasible payoffs by using first-order intervention rules. As
argued in Section III, it is impossible to provide an incentive for user i to choose pi = 0 by intervention
rules of any orders. Thus, we actually obtain the largest set of sustainable payoffs by using first-order
intervention rules. This discussion suggests that the potential gain from using higher-order intervention
rules is not from what they can sustain but how they sustain a target power profile.
Remark 1: An extreme intervention rule f Ie [21], defined by
f Ie (p) =

0, if p = p⋆,
P0, if p 6= p⋆,
(16)
can be considered as the limiting case of first-order intervention rules as each αi goes to infinity in that the
area of the region {p : f Ie (p) 6= f I1 (p)} approaches zero in the limit. With this class of intervention rules,
we have E(f Ie ) = {p⋆,P} if P0 ≥ PB1(p⋆) and E(f Ie ) = {P} otherwise. Therefore, it is impossible
to construct an extreme intervention rule that strongly sustains a target power profile, except in the
uninteresting case p⋆ = P. This motivates us to study intervention rules other than extreme intervention
rules.
B. Dynamic Adjustment Processes
Previously, we have derived the conditions under which a target power profile is (strongly) sustained.
Now we propose a dynamic adjustment process, in order to guide the intervention device and the users to
achieve the target power profile as NE. The adjustment occurs at discrete steps, labeled as t = 1, 2, . . ..
We allow the use of different intervention rules in different steps. Thus, the beginning of each step is
triggered by the intervention device’s announcement of the intervention rule to be used in that step. Users
are synchronized by the announcement of the intervention rules. The adjustment process is based on the
myopic best-response updates of the users and is described in Algorithm 1.
During the adjustment process, the designer may use different intervention rules, as well as intermediate
target profiles different from the final target p⋆. That is, we have f t ∈ F1(p˜t), where p˜t is the intermediate
target power profile at step t. In the adjustment process, the designer chooses a sequence of intervention
rules. Suppose that the designer uses an update rule ψ : P → F1 to determine an intervention rule based
on the power profile in the previous step. Then given an initial power profile p0, an update rule yields
a sequence of intervention rules and power profiles {(f t,pt)}∞t=1.10 We can evaluate an update rule by
10Since the best response correspondence is non-singleton only in knife-edge cases, we focus on update rules that yield a
deterministic sequence.
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Algorithm 1 A dynamic adjustment process.
1: Initialization: t = 0
2: The users choose an initial power profile p0.
3: The designer announces the use of first-order intervention rules f t ∈ F1 with power budget P0.
4: while pt 6= p⋆ or f t(pt) 6= 0 do
5: t← t+ 1
6: Given pt−1, the designer chooses and broadcasts the intervention rates αti and the target power
profile p˜t for the current time slot t.
7: Given f t(p) =
[∑N
i=1 α
t
i
∣∣pi − p˜ti∣∣]P0
0
, each user i chooses a best response to pt−1−i :
8: pti ∈ BRi(f
t,pt−1−i ) , argmaxpi∈Pi γi(f
t, pi,p
t−1
−i ).
9: end while
the following two criteria.
1) Convergence: Does the induced sequence reach an equilibrium (f,p⋆)? If so, how many steps are
needed?
2) Minimum power budget: How much power budget is needed to execute {f t}∞t=1, i.e., supt supp∈P f t(p)?
The following theorem shows that when the target power profile p⋆ is close to the maximum power
profile P and the intervention capability P0 is large, we can obtain fast convergence as well as strong
sustainment.
Theorem 3: For any p⋆ ∈
∏
i(0, Pi] such that
∑N
i=1(Pi−p
⋆
i )/Pi < 1, there exists (α1, . . . , αN ) ∈ RN+
such that
αi >
1
p⋆i
∑
j 6=i
αj(Pj − p
⋆
j) +
∑
j 6=i hijPj + ni
p⋆ihi0
(17)
for all i ∈ N˜ (p⋆). Suppose that f s1 ∈ F1(p⋆) satisfies (17) and
P0 >
Pi
p⋆i
∑
j 6=i
αj(Pj − p
⋆
j) +
(Pi − p
⋆
i )(
∑
j 6=i hijPj + ni)
p⋆ihi0
(18)
for all i ∈ N˜ (p⋆). Then {p⋆} = E(f s1 ). Moreover, starting from an arbitrary initial power profile p0 6= p⋆,
the adjustment process with f t = f s1 for all t = 1, 2, . . . reaches (f s1 ,p⋆) in at most two steps (and in
one step if p0 ∈
∏
i[p
⋆
i , Pi]).
Proof: See [23, Appendix D].
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The minimum power budget required to execute an intervention rule described in Theorem 3 is given
by
P˜B
s
1(p
⋆) =
1
1−
∑N
i=1
Pi−p⋆i
Pi
N∑
i=1
(Pi − p
⋆
i )(
∑
j 6=i hijPj + ni)
Pihi0
. (19)
Since the requirement for αi in (17) is more stringent than that in (11), we have P˜B
s
1(p
⋆) ≥ PB
s
1(p
⋆)
with equality if and only if N ′ ≤ 1. The difference P˜B
s
1(p
⋆) − PB
s
1(p
⋆) can be considered as the
price of fast convergence to p⋆ in terms of the minimum power budget. In addition to requiring a larger
power budget, Theorem 3 imposes a restriction on the range of target profiles. That is, the target should
be close enough to P for the result of Theorem 3 to hold. However, the target may not satisfy the
restriction
∑N
i=1(Pi − p
⋆
i )/Pi < 1. In this case, the designer needs to use intermediate target power
profiles that are successively close to one another in order to guide the users to the final target. The
use of intermediate target power profiles is also necessary when the intervention device does not have a
large enough power budget to strongly sustain a target power profile. In this case, the designer can use
a sequence of intervention functions to drive the users to reach the target power profile as the unique
outcome. This process requires smaller power budget than that required by strong sustainment, but may
take longer time for the system to reach the target power profile.
Define the relative distance from p to p′ by
d(p,p′) =
N∑
i=1
pi − p
′
i
pi
. (20)
Using the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3, we can show that, given pt−1, the designer can achieve the
intermediate target at step t, i.e., pt = p˜t only if p˜t satisfies d(pt−1, p˜t) < 1. This imposes a bound
on the relative distance between two successive intermediate targets. Below we provide two different
methods for the designer to generate intermediate targets. The first method, which is summarized in
Algorithm 2 and analyzed in Theorem 4, produces a sequence of intermediate targets reaching the final
target whose successive elements have a relative distance of δ ∈ (0, 1) while requiring the minimum
power budget in each step. This method can be used in a scenario where the power constraint of the
intervention device does not bind; the designer can fix δ sufficiently close to 1, and the method will
allow the system to reach the final target in the minimum number of steps. The second method, which is
summarized in Algorithm 3 and analyzed in Theorem 5, yields a sequence of intermediate targets with
the largest relative distance in each step while satisfying the power constraint. Thus, this method will
allow the manager with a limited power budget to reach the final target as fast as possible.
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Now suppose that a fixed relative distance between two successive targets is given. Algorithm 2 provides
a method for the designer to generate intermediate targets in the most power-budget efficient way.
Algorithm 2 An algorithm that generates a sequence of intermediate target power profiles with a fixed
relative distance.
Require: Fix δ ∈ (0, 1) close to 1
1: Initialization (t = 1): Set p˜1 = P {This step can be skipped if p0 = P} and M = N
2: Set µi = p⋆i /p˜1i for all i ∈ N
3: while
∑N
i=1(p˜
t
i − p
⋆
i )/p˜
t
i ≥ 1 do
4: t← t+ 1
5: while
∑N
i=1 µi < N − δ do
6: Choose i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈M
∑
j 6=i hij p˜
t−1
j +ni
hi0
7: Set µi∗ = min{1, N − δ −
∑
j 6=i∗ µj} and M←M\ {i∗}
8: end while
9: Set p˜ti = p⋆i /µi for all i ∈ N
10: end while
11: Set p˜t = p⋆
The following theorem shows that the designer can lead the users to the final target by using interme-
diate targets generated by Algorithm 2 provided that the intervention capability is sufficiently large.
Theorem 4: For any p⋆ ∈
∏
i(0, Pi], if δ ≥ 1 −mini(p⋆i /Pi), then Algorithm 2 terminates at a finite
step T with T ≤ N ′+1. Let (p˜t)Tt=1 be the sequence of power profiles generated by Algorithm 2. Then
there exists a sequence of intervention rules (f t)Tt=1 with f t ∈ F1(p˜t) such that the adjustment process
with (f t)Tt=1 yields pt = p˜t for all t = 1, . . . , T starting from any p0 ∈ P.
Proof: See [23, Appendix F].
Now we consider a scenario where the intervention capability P0 should be taken into consideration
while generating intermediate targets11. In this scenario, in order to induce the users to follow intermediate
targets during the adjustment process, the intermediate targets (p˜t)Tt=2 should satisfy not only
N∑
i=1
p˜t−1i − p˜
t
i
p˜t−1i
< 1 (21)
11Note that to sustain p⋆ as the NE, we require P0 to satisfy the conditions in Theorem 1.
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but also
P t0 , max
i∈N˜ (p˜t)
 Pip˜t−1i
∑N
j=1
(p˜t−1j −p˜
t
j)(
∑
k 6=j hjk p˜
t−1
k +nj)
p˜t−1j hj0
1−
∑N
j=1
p˜t−1j −p˜
t
j
p˜t−1j
+
(Pi − p˜
t−1
i )(
∑
j 6=i hij p˜
t−1
j + ni)
p˜t−1i hi0
 < P0 (22)
for all t = 2, . . . , T . In order to reach the final target in the minimum number of steps, we need to
maximize the relative distance between successive targets while satisfying the constraints (21) and (22).
Thus, the problem to obtain p˜t given p˜t−1 can be written as
maxp˜t
N∑
i=1
p˜t−1i − p˜
t
i
p˜t−1i
(23)
s.t. max
i∈N (p˜t)
 Pip˜t−1i
∑N
j=1
p˜t−1j −p˜
t
j
p˜t−1j
bt−1j
1−
∑N
j=1
p˜t−1j −p˜
t
j
p˜t−1j
+
Pi − p˜
t−1
i
p˜t−1i
bt−1i
 ≤ P0 − ε1 (24)
N∑
i=1
p˜t−1i − p˜
t
i
p˜t−1i
≤ 1− ε2 (25)
p⋆ ≤ p˜t ≤ p˜t−1 (26)
for small ε1, ε2 > 0. Algorithm 3 formalizes the method to generate a sequence of intermediate target
power profiles, which has maximal relative distances (MRD) between successive target power profiles
given an intervention capability P0. We call the sequence generated by Algorithm 3 the MRD sequence.
Note that the major complexity in solving the above problem is line 10 in Algorithm 3. This search on
p˜ti∗ can be done efficiently by bisection method, because P t0 is decreasing with p˜ti∗ .
Given the power budget P0, we are interested in the minimum convergence time for the dynamic
adjustment process to reach the target power profile p⋆, defined by T ⋆(p⋆) = inf {T : p˜T = p⋆}, where
the infimum is taken over the set of sequences satisfying (21) and (22) starting from p1 = P. In order
to obtain an upper bound for T ⋆(p⋆), we use an upper bound for the convergence time of a geometric
sequence of T intermediate target power profiles in the following form:
p˜ti = (ηi)
t−1Pi, ∀ i, t = 1, . . . , T, (27)
where ηi = (p⋆i /Pi)
1
T−1 , i = 1, . . . , N .
Theorem 5: If p0 6= p⋆,
∑N
i=1(Pi − p
⋆
i )/Pi ≥ 1, and
P0 >
(
max
i
Pi
p⋆i
− 1
)
max
i
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j + ni
hi0
, (28)
then T ⋆(p⋆) > 2 and T ⋆(p⋆) satisfies
N∑
i=1
(
p⋆i
Pi
) 1
T⋆(p⋆)−2
< N − 1 +
1
C
, (29)
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Algorithm 3 An algorithm that generates a sequence of intermediate target power profiles with maximal
relative distances given an intervention capability.
Require: Small ε1 ∈ (0, 1) and ε2 ∈ (0, 1); P0 − ε1 > max
i
{
Pi − p
⋆
i
p⋆i
·
∑
j 6=i hijPj + ni
hi0
}
1: Initialization (t = 1): Set p˜1 = P {This step can be skipped if p0 = P}
2: while p˜t 6= p⋆ do
3: t← t+ 1, M = {i : p˜t−1i > p
⋆
i }, p˜
t = p˜t−1
4: repeat
5: i∗ = mini∈M bt−1i , p˜
t
i∗ = max
{
p⋆i∗ , (N − 1 + ε2 −
∑
i 6=i∗ p˜
t
i/p˜
t−1
i ) · p˜
t−1
i∗
}
6: calculate P t0 by (22)
7: if P t0 < P0 − ε1 then
8: M←M\{i∗}
9: else if P t0 > P0 − ε1 then
10: find p˜ti∗ ∈
[
max
{
p⋆i∗ , (N − 1 + ε2 −
∑
i 6=i∗ p˜
t
i/p˜
t−1
i ) · p˜
t−1
i∗
}
, p˜t−1i∗
]
such that P t0 = P0 − ε1
11: end if
12: until P t0 = P0 − ε1 or M = ∅
13: end while
14: Set p˜t = p⋆
where
C =
P0
maxi
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j+ni
hi0
·maxi
Pi
p⋆i
+
1
maxi
Pi
p⋆i
. (30)
Proof: See [23, Appendix G].
The inequality (29) provides an upper bound for T ⋆(p⋆), since the left-hand side of (29) increases
in T ⋆(p⋆) and approaches N as T ⋆(p⋆) → ∞ while the right-hand side is smaller than N given (28).
From Theorem 5, we can see that the convergence time is small if the power budget P0 is large, the
target power profile is close to the maximum power (i.e. maxi Pip⋆i is small), or SINR is relatively small
compared to the channel gain from the intervention device (i.e. maxi
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j+ni
hi0
is small).
C. Relaxation of Monitoring Requirement
The results in this section so far relies on the ability of the intervention device to estimate individual
transmit powers. However, estimating individual transmit powers requires larger monitoring overhead for
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the intervention device than estimating aggregate receive power. In order to study intervention rules that
can be executed with the monitoring of aggregate receive power, we consider a class of intervention rules
that can be expressed as
fA1 (p) =
[
α0
∣∣∣∣∣
(
N∑
i=1
h0ipi
)
− p⋆A
∣∣∣∣∣
]P0
0
(31)
for some α0 ≥ 0, P0 > 0, and p⋆A. We call an intervention rule in this class a first-order intervention rule
based on aggregate receive power or, in short, an intervention rule based on aggregate power. We call
α0 the aggregate intervention rate, and call p⋆A the target aggregate power, which is set as the aggregate
receive power at the target power profile, i.e., p⋆A =
∑N
i=1 h0ip
⋆
i . We first give a necessary and sufficient
condition for an intervention rule based on aggregate power to sustain a target power profile.
Theorem 6: For any p⋆ ∈
∏
i(0, Pi], p
⋆ ∈ E(fA1 ) if and only if
α0 ≥ max
i∈N˜ (p⋆)
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j + ni
h0ip⋆ihi0
(32)
and
P0 ≥ max
i∈N˜ (p⋆)
(Pi − p
⋆
i )(
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j + ni)
p⋆ihi0
. (33)
Proof: See [23, Appendix H].
The minimum intervention capability required to sustain a target profile is not affected by using
aggregate receive power instead of individual transmit powers. However, the aggregate intervention rate
should be chosen high enough to prevent a deviation of any user, whereas with the monitoring of individual
transmit powers the intervention rates can be chosen individually for each user. This suggests that strong
sustainment is more difficult with intervention rules based on aggregate power. For example, P is also
sustained by fA1 if P0 ≤ α0
∑
j 6=i(h0jPj−p
⋆
j) for all i ∈ N˜ (p⋆), which is weaker than the corresponding
condition in the case of intervention rules based on individual powers, P0 ≤
∑
j 6=i αj(Pj − p
⋆
j) for all
i ∈ N˜ (p⋆). With the monitoring of individual powers, a deviation of each user can be detected and
punished. This leads to the property that the best response of user i is almost always either p⋆i or
Pi under first-order intervention rules based on individual powers. This implies that a power profile
sustained by a first-order intervention rule based on individual powers almost always belongs to the set∏
i{p
⋆
i , Pi}. In contrast, with the monitoring of aggregate power, only an aggregate deviation can be
detected. This yields a possibility that an intervention rule based on aggregate power sustains a power
profile that is different from the target but yields the same aggregate power. This possibility makes the
problem of coordination failure more worrisome because if the users are given only the target aggregate
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power p⋆A they may not know which power profile to select among those that yield the aggregate power
p⋆A.
12 The problem arising from the increased degree of non-uniqueness can be considered as the cost
of reduced monitoring overhead. To state the result formally, let αi0 = (
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j + ni)/(h0ip
⋆
ihi0)
and P i0 = (Pi − p⋆i )(
∑
j 6=i hijp
⋆
j + ni)/(p
⋆
i hi0) for all i ∈ N˜ (p⋆). Also, let α¯0 = maxi∈N˜ (p⋆) α
i
0 and
P¯0 = maxi∈N˜ (p⋆) P
i
0.
Theorem 7: Suppose that, for p⋆ ∈
∏
i(0, Pi], there exist i, j ∈ N˜ (p⋆) such that (i) α¯0 = αi0 > αj0 or
αi0, α
j
0 < α¯0, and (ii) P¯0 = P i0 > P j0 or P i0, P j0 < P¯0. Then for any fA1 such that p⋆ ∈ E(fA1 ) and for
any ǫ > 0, there exists p˜ 6= p⋆ such that p˜ ∈ E(fA1 ),
∑N
i=1 h0ip
⋆
i =
∑N
i=1 h0ip˜i, and |p˜− p⋆| < ǫ.
Proof: See [23, Appendix I].
Theorem 7 provides a sufficient condition under which the strong sustainment of a given target power
profile is impossible with intervention rules based on aggregate power. We argue that the sufficient
condition is mild. First, note that, for almost all p⋆ ∈
∏
i(0, Pi], α
i
0’s and P i0’s can be ordered strictly.
With strict ordering of αi0’s and P i0’s, we can always find a pair of users i, j ∈ N˜ (p⋆) satisfying the
condition in Theorem 7 if there are at least three users in N˜ (p⋆). That is, strong sustainment is generically
impossible with intervention rules based on aggregate power when |N˜ (p⋆)| ≥ 3.
V. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
In this section, we discuss some implementation issues. First, we provide algorithms for the intervention
device to estimate the system parameters and individual transmit powers without user cooperation. Then
we compare the communication overhead of the intervention scheme with that of other incentive schemes.
A. Estimation of System Parameters and Individual Transmit Powers
As we have seen from previous results (e.g. Theorems 1–3), in order to determine the intervention
rates and the power budget requirement, the designer needs to know the normalized cross channel gains
{hij
hi0
}Nj=1,j 6=i,∀i ∈ N , the normalized noise powers
ni
hi0
,∀i ∈ N , the maximum power levels Pi,∀i ∈ N ,
and the target power profile p⋆. We propose a method to estimate the normalized cross channel gains,
normalized noise powers, and the maximum power levels without user cooperation. Based on the above
parameters, the designer can determine the target power profile p⋆ by solving (4). In addition, we propose
a method to estimate the individual transmit powers without user cooperation.
12A way to overcome this problem is to broadcast the target power profile p⋆ to the users in order to make p⋆ as a focal
point [24].
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1) Normalized cross channel gains and noise powers: The designer estimates the normalized cross
channel gains and the normalized noise powers by adjusting the intervention rules and observing the
reaction of the users. First, the designer broadcast the intervention capability P0 and a temporary target
power profile p˜ < P. Then it makes N rounds of measurements at N different locations. We assume
that during the measurements, the users always choose the power levels that maximize their SINRs given
the intervention rule. Thus, we exclude the strategic behavior of the users to influence the measurements
in their favor. We also assume that the intervention device can move its receiver to N different locations,
or it has N receivers located at different locations.
Algorithm 4 The nth round of measurement performed by the intervention device.
Require: Error tolerance ε > 0
1: Initialization: Broadcast αj = 0, ∀j ∈ N
2: for index = 0 to N − 1 do
3: Set i = (n+ index) mod N , αi = 0, α¯i = 0, αi any positive value (preferably large)
4: Measure the aggregate receive power R¯i and set the current aggregate receive power Ri = R¯i
5: while α¯i = 0 or α¯i − αi > ε do
6: if α¯i = 0 and Ri = R¯i then
7: αi ← 2 · αi
8: else if Ri = R¯i then
9: αi ← αi, αi ← (αi + α¯i)/2
10: else
11: α¯i ← αi, αi ← (αi + α¯i)/2
12: end if
13: Broadcast the index i and the new αi, and measure the current aggregate receive power Ri
14: if Ri < R¯i then
15: Set Ri = Ri
16: end if
17: end while
18: end for
In round n, the designer adjusts the intervention rates one by one, starting from αn to αN , then from
α1 to αn−1. All measurements are made at the receiver at location n. When adjusting αi, the aim is to
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find α∗i , the minimum intervention rate at which user i’s best response is p˜i. We can calculate α∗i as
α∗i =

∑
i−1
j=1 hij p˜j+
∑
n−1
j=i+1 hijPj+
∑
N
j=n hij p˜j+ni
hi0
, i < n
∑
n−1
j=1 hijPj+
∑
i−1
j=n hij p˜j+
∑
N
j=i+1 hijPj+ni
hi0
, i ≥ n
. (34)
The designer tunes αi to find α∗i according to the change of the aggregate receive power. When αi > α∗i ,
user i’s best response is Pi, and the aggregate receive power at location n is
R¯ni =

∑i−1
j=1 h
n
0j p˜j +
∑n−1
j=i h
n
0jPj +
∑N
j=n h
n
0j p˜j + n0, i < n∑n−1
j=1 h
n
0jPj +
∑i−1
j=n h
n
0j p˜j +
∑N
j=i h
n
0jPj + n0, i ≥ n
, (35)
where hn0j is the channel gain from user j’s transmitter to the intervention device’s receiver at location
n. When αi > α∗i , user i’s best response is the target power profile p˜i, and the aggregate receive power
decreases to
Rni =

∑i
j=1 h
n
0j p˜j +
∑n−1
j=i+1 h
n
0jPj +
∑N
j=n h
n
0j p˜j + n0, i < n∑n−1
j=1 h
n
0jPj +
∑i
j=n h
n
0j p˜j +
∑N
j=i+1 h
n
0jPj + n0, i ≥ n
. (36)
During the measurement, the designer maintains an upper bound α¯i, at which the aggregate receive
power is Ri, and a lower bound αi, at which the aggregate receive power is R¯i. By bisection methods,
an estimate of α∗i , denoted by mni, is obtained within the error tolerance ε. The nth–round measurement
is summarized in Algorithm 4.
Round n returns a set of measurements {R¯ni , Rni }Ni=1, from which we obtain maximum power levels
{Pi}
N
i=1. Note that R¯ni −Rni = hn0i · (Pi − p˜i) for all i, n ∈ N . Thus, we have
hn0i = h
1
0i ·
R¯ni −R
n
i
R¯1i −R
1
i
, ∀i, n ∈ N . (37)
Since Rnn−1 =
∑N
j=1 h
n
0j p˜j (R10 = R1N when n = 1), using the above relationship between hn0i and h10i,
we have the following N linear equations
N∑
j=1
h10j ·
(
R¯nj −R
n
j
R¯1j −R
1
j
p˜j
)
= Rnn−1, n = 1, . . . , N, (38)
which we can solve for {h10j}Nj=1. Given {h10j}Nj=1, we can calculate {Pi}Ni=1 by using R¯1i − R1i =
h10i · (Pi − p˜i),∀i ∈ N .
Round n also returns another set of measurements mn = [mn1, . . . , mni, . . . , mnN ], where we
assume mni = α
∗
i . Given the measurements {mn}Nn=1, we can obtain the normalized cross channel gains
and the normalized noise powers. Specifically, from mn and mn+1,∀ n < N , we have
mn+1,i −mni =
hinPn − hinp˜n
hi0
, ∀ i 6= n, (39)
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from which we can get hin
hi0
= (mn+1,i −mni)/(Pn − p˜n),∀ i 6= n.
To sum up, we can get {hin
hi0
}i 6=n according to mn and mn+1 for all n < N , and get {hiNhi0 }i 6=N according
to mN and m1. Now that we know all the normalized channel gains, we can get the normalized noise
powers ni
hi0
from (34).
2) Individual Transmit Powers: The byproduct of the above estimation is the channel gains from
the users to the intervention device at N different locations: {hn0i}Ni=1, n = 1, . . . , N . At any time, the
intervention device can measure the aggregate received power at all the N locations
N∑
j=1
hn0jpj + n
n
0 , (40)
where nn0 is the noise power known to the intervention device. Since the designer knows the values of
N different linear combinations of the N individual transmit powers, it can solve the group of N linear
equations to obtain the individual transmit powers. The complexity of this operation is of the order N3.
B. Comparison of Communication Overhead
Now we compare the communication overhead of the intervention scheme with that of other frame-
works, including network utility maximization [4][5], game theoretic control based on taxation [8]–[13],
and mechanism design [14][15]. Before the comparison, we would like to emphasize that the intervention
scheme works for selfish users, who have no incentive to provide any information to anyone else. As
shown in Table II, intervention requires no information flow from the users to the designer. On the
contrary, the other works assume that the users are obedient to exchange information with the designer
or among each other according to some prescribed rules.
The communication overhead is measured by the total amount of information flow before the system
reaches the desired operating point. Specifically, the amount of information flow is measured by the
number of real numbers broadcast by the users and the intervention device, ignoring quantization and
coding. The communication overhead can be further categorized into the communication overhead on the
users and that on the designer. We summarize the comparison in Table II. In each framework, we select
representative algorithms to calculate the communication overhead. Hence, the numbers in the table are
not precise for all the algorithms, but are correct in terms of the order.
We can see from Table II that in intervention, users have zero communication overhead. In other words,
the intervention device does not rely on the users to provide information. While in other frameworks,
users may be required to broadcast some information. Hence, intervention is more suitable when users
are selfish and unwilling to provide information truthfully. Another advantage of intervention is that its
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD OF DIFFERENT FRAMEWORKS
Framework Users The Designer Overall
Intervention 0 2N2 log
2
(1/ε) + 2N · T ⋆(p⋆) 2N2 log
2
(1/ε) + 2N · T ⋆(p⋆)
Network utility maximization N ([4]) or 0 ([5]) 0 ([4]) or N ([5])
N in each step
[4][5] in each step in each step
Game theoretic control
N in each step N in each step 2N in each step
based on taxation [8]–[13]
Mechanism design [14][15] N2 in each step N in each step N2 +N in each step
communication overhead can be bounded analytically. While in other frameworks, the convergence speed
to the desired operating point is not guaranteed. The detailed analysis is as follows.
1) Intervention: The communication overhead of intervention is comprised of two parts. The first part
is the overhead of estimating normalized cross channel gains and noise powers. The temporary target
power profile p˜ and the intervention capability P0 is broadcast at the beginning, which we omit here.
There are N rounds of measurement. In each round, the intervention device needs to broadcast the initial
intervention rates (line 1 in Algorithm 4), and the indices and the values of the intervention rates it is
adjusting (line 13 in Algorithm 4). Since it uses bisection methods to adjust the intervention rate, the
number of adjustments is log2(1/ε) for each intervention rate, where ε is the error tolerance in estimating
intervention rates in Algorithm 4. In sum, the communication overhead in estimating system parameters
is N(2N log2(1/ε) + 1) ≈ 2N2 log2(1/ε) for all intervention rates.
The second part is the communication overhead during the convergence to NE. In general, this overhead
depends on the target power profile and the intervention capability. If the target power profile is close to
the maximum power level (∑Ni=1(Pi− p⋆i )/P i < 1) and the intervention capability is large (Theorem 3),
the convergence is in one step. If the target power profile is not close enough or the intervention capability
is limited, we need to use the dynamic adjustment process. The convergence is in N ′ + 1 steps if the
intervention capability is large (Theorem 4), and is in T ⋆(p⋆) steps if the intervention capability is limited
(Theorem 5). In each step, the intermediate target power profile and the intervention rates are broadcast.
In summary, the worst-case communication overhead during the convergence to NE is 2N · T ⋆(p⋆).
2) Other frameworks: The communication overhead of other frameworks is the total information flow
during the convergence to the desired operating point. Unlike intervention, the number of steps during
the convergence is not bounded. Hence, the communication overhead could be arbitrarily large.
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Fig. 1. An example single-hop wireless ad-hoc network with two users.
If users cooperate with the designer to maximize the assigned utility function, as in [4][5] and [8]–[13],
the information flow in one step can be less than that in intervention. In network utility maximization,
either each user or the base station will broadcast at least N signals for all the users. In [4], each user
broadcast its own interference price. In [5], the base station broadcast “load” and “spillage”. In game
theoretic control based on taxation [8]–[13], the base station broadcast N prices, usually different for
different users. To obtain the optimal pricing, users report back some information, such as their payoffs
or interferences, to adjust prices.
In mechanism design [14][15], similar to intervention, the designer does not know the utility function
of each user. In this case, the information flow in one step is of the same order as that in intervention.
Specifically, each user broadcast its own version of optimal power allocation vector in each step, and
the designer broadcast the reference power allocation vector. Hence, the amount of information flow is
N2 +N in each step.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider a two-user network shown in Fig. 1. User 2’s transmitter is near to user 1’s receiver, causing
significant interference to user 1. The distance from user 1’s transmitter to its receiver is normalized to 1.
Originally, the distance from user 2’s transmitter to its receiver is 0.5. The vertical distance between the
two users’ transmitters and that between the two users’ receivers are both 0.5. Without specific notice,
October 31, 2018 DRAFT
27
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Distance between the transmitter and receiver of user 2
So
cia
l w
el
fa
re
 
 
Sum rate − optimal achievable by intervention
Sum rate − at NE without intervention
Fairness − optimal achievable by intervention
Fairness − at NE without intervention
Fig. 2. The optimal social welfare achievable by intervention and the social welfare at NE without intervention, when user 2’s
transmitter moves away from its receiver.
we assume that the positions of the transmitters and receivers of both users remain the same. In the
simulation of Fig. 2, we let user 2’s transmitter move away from its receiver as shown by the dashed left
arrow, resulting in less interference to user 1. The channel gain h is reciprocal to the distance d with the
path loss exponent a, namely h = d−a. We assume an indoor environment where a = 3 [25]. The noise
powers at the receivers of both users are 0.2. The power budgets of both users are 10.
A. Performance Improvement By Intervention
Now we examine the performance improvement by using intervention mechanisms. We let user 2’s
transmitter moves away from its receiver. In Fig. 2, we show the performance achieved by intervention
and that at the NE without intervention, under two criteria for social welfare. The sum rate is define by
log (1 + γ1) + log (1 + γ2) , (41)
and the fairness is defined by the “max-min” fairness [1, pp. 392][5][26]
min {log (1 + γ1) , log (1 + γ2)} . (42)
As we can see from Fig. 2, the sum rate achievable by intervention doubles that at the NE without
intervention in all the cases. The fairness achievable by intervention is much larger than that at the NE
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Fig. 3. Contour of the minimum power budget of first-order intervention under different target power profiles. (a): minimum
power budget to sustain a target power profile obtained by Theorem 1 and Theorem 6; (b): minimum power budget to strongly
sustain a target power profile obtained by simulation; (c): upper bound on the minimum power budget to strongly sustain a
target power profile obtained by Theorem 2; (d): upper bound on the minimum power budget for strong sustainment and fast
convergence obtained by Theorem 3.
without intervention in most cases. When the distance from user 2’s transmitter to its receiver is 1.0, the
network is symmetric. Only at this point is the NE without intervention optimal in terms of fairness.
B. Minimum Power Budget
Now we show the power budget requirement for different intervention rules. In Fig. 3, we show the
contour of the minimum power budget for different intervention rules under different target power profiles.
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Fig. 4. Given the relative distance between adjacent target power profiles, the convergence time and the power budget requirement
of different sequences of intermediate target power profiles in a five-user network. The relative distance between the maximum
power profile and the target power profile is
∑
5
i=1
Pi−p
⋆
i
Pi
= 3.6 > 1. (a): convergence time; (b): power budget requirement.
Fig. 3(a) shows minimum power budget to sustain a target power profile using first-order intervention
based on individual transmit powers obtained by Theorem 1 and that using first-order intervention based
on aggregate receive power obtained by Theorem 6. Since the power budget requirements are the same
for these two intervention rules, we show them in the same figure. Fig. 3(b) shows the minimum power
budget to strongly sustain a target power profile obtained by simulation. As we expect, the power budget
requirement for strong sustainment is higher. Fig. 3(c) shows the upper bound on the minimum power
budget to strongly sustain a target power profile obtained by Theorem 2. We can see that the result in
Theorem 2 serves as a good upper bound. Finally, Fig. 3(d) shows the upper bound on the minimum
power budget for strong sustainment and fast convergence obtained by Theorem 3. In this case, the system
reaches NE in at most two time slots. To achieve this fast convergence, the intervention device needs
a much higher power budget. In addition, not all the target power profiles can be sustained. The target
power profiles that cannot be sustained lie in the shadow area in the figure.
C. Power Budget and Convergence Time Tradeoff In Dynamic Adjustment Process
Now we study the tradeoff between the power budget and the convergence time in the dynamic
adjustment process. Here the convergence time is measured as the number of steps in the adjustment
process. To better illustrate the tradeoff, we use a five-user network in the simulation for Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Given power budget requirements, the convergence time of different sequences of intermediate target power profiles in
a five-user network. The relative distance between the maximum power profile and the target power profile is
∑
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The channel gains and noise powers used in the simulation are one realization of the random variables.
Since different realizations result in similar tradeoff, we only show the results for one realization. The
target power profile is p⋆1 = P1 and p⋆i = 0.1Pi for i > 1. Since the relative distance between the
maximum power profile and the target power profile is
∑5
i=1
Pi−p⋆i
Pi
= 3.6 > 1, we cannot reach the
target power profile from the maximum power profile directly using Theorem 3. Instead, we need a
sequence of intermediate target power profile before we reach the final target power profile.
First, suppose that there is no power budget requirement. Without power budget limit, our goal is to
reach the final target power profile in as few time slots as possible. Since it is not easy to construct a
sequence of intermediate target power profiles given a desired convergence time, we construct the sequence
according to the desired relative distance between adjacent intermediate target power profiles, which is
an indicator for the convergence time. In Fig. 4, we show the convergence time and the power budget
requirement of the MRD sequence generated by Algorithm 2 and the geometric sequence under different
relative distances. We can see from Fig 4(a) that a larger relative distance results in a faster convergence
for both sequences. Thus, we can use the relative distance, a metric amenable for the construction of the
sequence, to control the convergence speed of the adjustment process. In particular, when the relative
distance is δ = 0.9 = 1−mini{p⋆i /Pi}, the MRD sequence converges in N ′+1 = 5 steps as predicted by
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Theorem 4. In Fig 4(b), we can see that for both sequences, the power budget requirement is decreasing
with the relative distances in most cases. The power budget is lower for the MRD sequence. For both
sequences, it requires much less power by the dynamic adjustment process than by the strong sustainment
condition in Theorem 2.
Second, suppose that there is a power budget requirement. Given different power budget requirements,
we show the convergence time of MRD and geometric sequences and the upper bound on the convergence
time in Fig. 5. We can see from the figure that under most power budget requirements, the convergence
time of MRD sequence is roughly half of that of the naive geometric sequence. When the power budget
is small (near to the minimum power budget that sustains the target power profile), the fast convergence
of MRD sequence is even more significant compared to that of the geometric sequence. When the
power budget approaches the minimum requirement that strongly sustains the target power profile, the
convergence time of MRD sequence is 5, which is half of that of the geometric sequence.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed incentive schemes based on intervention for power control in single-
hop wireless ad hoc networks with selfish users. We formulated a game-theoretic model of power
control with an intervention device and proposed design criteria that desirable intervention rules should
satisfy. Focusing on a simple class of intervention rules called first-order intervention rules, we provided
requirements for intervention rules to sustain a target power profile when the intervention device estimates
individual transmit powers or aggregate receive power. We also proposed dynamic adjustment processes
to guide users to a target power profile through intermediate targets. We discussed implementation issues
and presented simulation results. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to investigate
intervention schemes in a power control scenario. For future research, we can apply intervention schemes
to different power control scenarios, for example, a scenario where users can allocate their power budgets
across multiple channels and a scenario where users care about their energy consumption as well as their
data rates.
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